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Incommensurate technological 
paradigms? Quarreling in the RFID 
industry
Nicholas Dew
Dosi’s work on technology paradigms and trajectories has emerged as an important
idea in evolutionary approaches to the economics of innovation. This article
explores these ideas using one particular case history. I examine how two techno-
logy paradigms clashed in the radio frequency identification (RFID) industry in the
2000–2002 period, a clash that manifested itself in a public quarrel that broke out
between proponents of an incumbent paradigm and a challenger paradigm.
These events present an excellent vantage point from which to observe a debate
between two different technological perspectives within one industry to gain
insights into the influence of technology paradigms.
1. Introduction
Dosi’s (1982, 1984, 1988, 1997) work on technology paradigms and trajectories has
emerged as an important idea in evolutionary approaches to the economics of innova-
tion. According to Dosi (1988), “A technological paradigm is both an exemplar—an
artifact to that is to be developed and improved (such as a car, an integrated circuit, a
lathe...)—and a set of heuristics (e.g. Where do we go from here? Where should we
search? What sort of knowledge should we draw on?).” One of the key ideas of techno-
logy paradigms and trajectories is that, once established, these technological guide
posts have a “life of their own,” that is technologies display a momentum of their own
that is built upon the accumulated inputs of multiple actors. Paradigms define the
“normal” problem-solving activity of technologists operating with the paradigm as
defined by the know-how, equipment, knowledge, procedures, and experience which
is accumulated by actors who make a living by dwelling in the paradigm, often over
long periods of time (Molina, 1993). Based on the past triumphs of a paradigm, indi-
viduals working within a paradigm inhabit a particular “worldview” (Kuhn, 1962);
and these worldviews are not just shared practices, but they are also often embedded
in the structure and organization of firms and whole industrial sectors (Freeman and
Perez, 1988; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Occasionally, “incommensurate” paradigms
clash spectacularly within an industry as “normal” technology and “revolutionary”
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This article explores many of these ideas using one particular case history. The
unique contribution of the article is to examine how two technology paradigms
clashed in the radio frequency identification (RFID) industry in the period 2000–2002,
a clash that manifested itself in a public quarrel that broke out between proponents of
an incumbent paradigm and a challenger paradigm1. Such records of incommensura-
bility are important because they may be interpreted as providing fairly strong
evidence for the presence of technology paradigms, particularly when there is evidence
of multiple actors sharing worldviews, as there is in this case. The clash of paradigms
in the RFID industry presents an excellent vantage point from which to observe the
details of two paradigms interacting in a contemporary setting based on records that
are barely history. The data and analysis are based on recent public records of the
quarrel between incumbents and challengers and are supplemented by interview data
gathered directly from some of the participants close to the time.
This article builds on the work of prior scholars who have documented the back
and forth of similar debates between industry participants. Balmer and Sharp (1993)
investigated the case of conflicting scientific and technological paradigms among
government institutions sponsoring the British biotechnology industry in the 1980s,
concluding that the bitter quarrel that broke out offers important insights into pre-
vailing paradigms of scientific and technical inquiry. Garud and Rappa (1994) docu-
mented the debate between proponents of different paradigms in the emerging
cochlear implant industry, charting the co-evolution of factors that impacted the
institutional and technological landscape of that industry. Garud and Karnoe (2003)
addressed contrasting (paradigmatic) approaches to wind power innovation utilized
by Danish and US firms and the process by which the Danish paradigm (premised on
an accumulation of incremental innovations) prevailed over the US paradigm (prem-
ised on breakthrough innovations). However, I am not familiar with any article in the
literature that addresses the issue of incommensurate technology paradigms at the
level of detail discussed in this article. The recent unfolding events in the RFID industry
1The history of the RFID industry is quite rich and several different explanations can be offered in order
to understand events within the industry. At least three different perspectives might be taken on
events in the RFID industry: technology paradigms (as described in this article), path dependent (the
David/Arthur model: see David, 1985; Arthur, 1989), and strategic sponsorship (institutional entre-
preneurship: see Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993 and Garud et al, 2002). Path-dependent explana-
tions focus on market drivers of technological lock-in, such as technological complementarities and
network effects, which have played a role in the dynamics of the RFID industry. Strategic sponsorship
focuses on the activities of players to affect the institutional structure of the industry, through tech-
nical standards-setting activities for example. These activities have also had a role in the RFID industry
(Dew, 2006). Both these perspectives run alongside and complement the exposition in this article,
which focuses on the role of conflicting technological paradigms—a term Dosi (Dosi, 1982) has used
to describe the underlying “research programs” driving innovative activity in certain technologies.
Overall, the questions addressed by each of these perspectives are quite different, as are the research
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present a unique opportunity to observe a debate between two different technological
perspectives within one industry to evaluate the influence of technology paradigms.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly explain what RFID is
and give a quick history of the technology and basic industry background. I then
describe the emergence of a new initiative in the RFID industry—the Auto ID Center
(AIDC) consortium—and recount the public quarrel that almost immediately
emerged between existing industry players and the center. Section 3 briefly reviews the
literature on scientific and technological paradigms. In section 4, I trace how techno-
logy paradigms help explain the quarreling in the RFID industry in the period 2000–
2002, an analysis that illustrates some of the practical implications of “inhabiting a
worldview” (Kuhn, 1962). The final section concludes the article.
2. Background
2.1 RFID history
RFID tags are wireless bar codes. The underlying technology they are based on is
“laughably” old (Booth-Thomas, 2003), sharing its roots with the set of fundamental
scientific discoveries in radio waves that first saw commercialization by Marconi just
after the turn of the twentieth century. RFID development was initially spawned by
the invention of radar, which was decisive in the Allies victory in World War II. Large,
powered RFID tags (also known as transponders) were placed on friendly aircraft.
When interrogated by a radar signal, these transponders would give the appropriate
response to identify the carrying aircraft as “friendly.” This IFF (Identify: Friend or Foe)
system was the first obvious use of RFID. Present-day aviation traffic control is still
based on IFF concepts.
RFID has evolved through three technology generations. First generation RFID tags
were built around circuit boards, making them as big as, or bigger than, a brick. The tag
is “read” by a RFID reader that emits radio waves, normally in one of five ranges of the
radio spectrum: 125–134 khz, 13.56 mhz, 870–930 mhz, 2.45 ghz, or 5.8 ghz (spectrum
allocations vary by country and by use). Like several other significant technologies
(high-performance avionics, integrated circuits, and computer software), much of the
research and development for RFID was sponsored by the US military, and early appli-
cations of the technology were mainly for military uses or closely associated purposes,
such as tracking railcars transporting nuclear waste. The research and development of
RFID started in the 1950s, continued through the 1960s, and exploded in the 1970s
(Landt, 2001). Researchers at the government-sponsored Los Alamos National Labora-
tory (LASL) were central in many of these developments, and later, in the 1990s, the
Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNL) became instrumental in technical advances.
Second generation RFID tags are microchip-based. The relentless miniaturization of
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thumb-sized RFID tags consisting of a microchip (a silicon integrated circuit) with a
copper radio antenna coiled around it that looks like the coil of an electric hot plate.
These tags are passive, so-called because they require no battery; instead they get their
power from the interrogation signal of the reader. The microchip revolution in RFID
was spawned by the transfer, in 1977, of government-developed technology through
LASL initially to two private firms: Amtech (now part of Transcore) and Identronix
(now part of Escort Memory Systems). By 1984, RFID microchips were regularly
being manufactured by several US and European companies and have since become
high-volume/low-cost commodity items for larger companies such as Texas Instru-
ments (TIRIS), Motorola (until recently, their Indala division), EM Microelectronics
(EMS-Sokymat), and Phillips Semiconductors (Mikron).
In the United States, the mainstream adoption of RFID began with tollbooths,
starting with the Dallas toll road in the 1980s and proceeding in other states, such as
California and New Jersey’s EZPass systems. In the same period, the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) standardized on RFID as a means of tracking railcars after
disastrous trials with bar coding. Before adopting RFID, “They’d lose railroad cars or
whole trains.” (Landt, personal communication). In the period 1991–1993, the major
railway operators in North America spent $200 million to adopt RFID by installing 3
million tags (at $30 each) on 1.5 million cars and locomotives, and 3,000 readers (at
$50,000 each, installed) in strategic locations all over North America (the United
States, Canada, and Mexico). Much of the history of firms producing and installing
RFID systems in this early period is something of a mystery: no database is known to
exist (Landt, personal communication).
The use of microchips cheapened RFID tags significantly (eventually to a few
dollars each) and, somewhat predictably, applications began to spring up in access
systems for office buildings and keyless entry systems for cars (which made up
approximately half of worldwide deliveries of RFID transponders in 2000). Other
common uses are Exxon Mobil’s Speedpass pay-at-the-pump system and animal
identification (cattle, fish, household pets, and wildlife). In Europe, Sokymat
(Switzerland) and Rafsec (Finland) led the way on assembling finished RFID-enabled
items, such as keyless entry systems and reusable metro and bus passes. In the United
States, the largest and most innovative player was undoubtedly Texas Instruments’
TiRiS division, which sponsored many of the more innovative applications of RFID
tagging, such as timekeeping by tagging runners in the 1996 Boston Marathon. In the
1990s, a large number of small and midsize RFID suppliers developed, including
diversifying entrants from nearby industries (such as the bar code industry) that saw
RFID as a complementary automatic identification technology. Estimates vary, but all
suggest the RFID industry was worth substantially less than a billion dollars a year in
the late 1990s (inclusive of tags, hardware, and services).
Two other important developments occurred in the 1990s. First, the US Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) began rolling-out several RFID-enabled systems. The spark
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with vital supplies bound for troops fighting the first Gulf War. Upon arrival in the
Gulf, logisticians had to assign hundreds of personnel to opening each container to
find out what was actually in it. After this, the DOD let three consecutive $25MM/year
three-year contracts for an RFID system that tracks containers and their contents to a
Californian firm, SAVI Technology (SAVI was founded on an idea that failed—the
idea of tracking lost children after the founder lost his child at a park; this idea was
unsuccessful, but the same idea applied to container parks was a big hit). Post 9–11,
the SAVI container tracking system is fast morphing into a general container/mari-
time port security system under the auspices of Homeland Security and is now being
rolled-out globally.
The DOD also developed RFID at small scale, investing in fundamental and
applied research at PNL to track night vision goggles and M15 rifles, create electronic
dog tags, and monitor aircraft brakes and solid rocket fuel, several classified projects
run by three-letter agencies, and some involving the use of RFID-equipped insects
(bumblebees to find land mines and remote-controlled cockroaches as carriers of lis-
tening and image collection devices). In 2002 Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Micro Electronics Agency (DMEA) awarded a
four-year $120MM research and development contract to Alien Technology Inc.,
North Dakota State University, and the University of Alaska at Fairbanks to develop
RFID technology as a battlefield communication system based on the idea of develop-
ing sensors that are so small that they can be disguised as pebbles and seeds dropped
by the tens of thousands over battlefields. These sensors would be able to detect vibra-
tions caused by enemy convoys, chemical or biological agents, or even just the sound
of enemy soldiers breathing.
The second important development of the 1990s was standardization efforts. Like
the first generation of RFID tags, second generation RFID systems are based on manu-
facturers’ proprietary technology. Under the International Standards Organization (ISO),
there were ongoing and serious attempts to create standards for RFID. In addition, the
Uniform Code Council (UCC, which runs the bar-coding system) sponsored the glo-
bal tag (GTAG) initiative which, in effect, was a RFID tag that carried a bar code.
2.2 The emergence of the AIDC
In the late 1990s, several organizations began to consider a successor technology to the
bar code including Wal*Mart, which experienced tremendous success with bar coding
and continuously prodded its major suppliers for new initiatives (Dunlop and Rivkin,
1997; Eberhardt, personal communication), and the UCC, which developed and
administers the bar code system (Brown, 1997; Haberman, 2001). This resulted in the
launch of the AIDC at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which aspired to
develop a third generation of RFID tags. The AIDC was symbolically launched at the
Smithsonian museum in Washington D.C. on the 25th anniversary celebration of the
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discover what will follow the bar code.” (Rittenhouse and David, 1999). Funding for
the center was provided by charging members a joining fee of $300,000, with initial
funding provided by Proctor and Gamble (P&G), Gillette, the UCC, the European
Article Numbering association (EAN), and the MIT. The center subsequently
developed into a consortium of 100 major organizations. The AIDC had a triple role:
• A research consortium focused on inventing and innovating with RFID technology.
The AIDC proposed a radical change to the basic architecture of RFID technology.
In the proposed system, RFID tags hold a 96-digit identifying number called an
electronic product code (EPC) that can be used to uniquely identify any object.
• A standards consortium focused on creating technical standards for the EPC, by
consensus among the membership. A key role of the AIDC was the development of
“open” standards for RFID central to which would be a free open software system
that the center would research and design. The system would be designed to work
with any kind of RFID tag carrying an EPC.
• A facilitator for the adoption of the EPC. The center promoted the adoption of the
EPC in industry through an extensive education program. The aim of this program
was to encourage widespread diffusion of the EPC to drive up tag volumes and
drive down tag costs.
2.3 A public quarrel erupts
Within a few months of its founding, the AIDC found itself in conflict with key elements
of the existing RFID industry. The opening salvo was fired by Supply Chain Systems, a
popular industry trade magazine servicing the logistics industry (at the time, it was
known as ID Systems). It published an editorial comment which it carried in its weekly
online newsletter Newslink, entitled “ADC’s Future Is Out of Sight” (ADC referred to
AIDC). In the article, commentator Paul Quinn reflected the general tone of skepticism
with which RFID industry incumbents greeted the AIDC. Referring to MIT, Gillette,
P&G, and the UCC, Quinn equivocally remarked, “Were the founders of a major new
research lab of less stature, it would be easier to ignore their mission.” (Quinn, 2000a).
The article quoted part of an interview conducted by Quinn with Kevin Ashton, the
executive director of the AIDC, where Ashton circulated the idea that the center would
research and develop a five-cent RFID tag (this was approximately a 10-times reduction
in cost, based on typical RFID industry metrics in 2000). Quinn then followed:
All of which is way cool. But nagging questions remain:
• What’s going to be the real cost of a tag, and will this cost be justified in
terms of streamlining the supply chain?
• Can the problem of interference from metal, including containers and
equipment, be overcome?
• How much read range is enough, and can this arbitrary range be







aval Postgraduate School D
udley Knox Library user on 02 Septem
ber 2021
Incommensurate technological paradigms 791
• What’s going to happen to end users’ existing investment in bar code
equipment?
• Is the fundamental problem of reading many tags at the same time
going to be licked?
• Is it realistic to hope for a true universal standard?
Meanwhile, back at warehouse (and the factory, and every other station in
the supply chain), efficiency rules. And although today’s state-of-the-art
ADC solution may be overshadowed by something better a few years
down the road, it will be a long time before it becomes obsolete. (empha-
sis added) (Quinn, 2000a)
The “way cool” comment, which was industry vernacular for “unrealistic,”
prompted a debate which was published by ID Systems later that year. In November
2000 Quinn wrote again, this time under the title, “Can an RFID Tag Turn on a
Dime?” (Quinn, 2000b). This time Quinn carried a letter by James Heurich, presid-
ent of RFID Inc., a well-established privately-held producer of RFID tags and read-
ers, together with a reply by Kevin Ashton. These two letters expressed conflicting
views about the prospects for cheap tags in the RFID industry and sharp differences
of opinion about both the prospects of RFID tagging substituting bar codes and the
virtues of getting users excited about such a prospect. Heurich represented the
views of the established incumbent industry players. Ashton represented the views
of a challenger group of firms assembling in the AIDC consortium. According to
Heurich:
The primary reason a 10-cent Tag is simply not achievable is an evaluation
of costs. These are no secrets, everyone, EVERYONE, who owns or pro-
duces their own silicon knows it costs an average of 7 to 12 cents to pro-
duce a die as it sits on a wafer. The wafer must then be sliced and diced,
then picked and placed...picking and placing adds around 10 cents, and
additional components like the antenna/adhesive package or sometimes a
necessary external capacitor can add 5 cents. Not figured into these esti-
mates are the costs of competent employees handling the materials, ship-
ping, fallout, etc. And these estimates are for quantities in the hundreds of
millions. Quantities of only 1 million would easily triple or quadruple the
variable costs. (emphasis added) (Quinn, 2000b)
In other words, component costs alone amount to 22–27 cents for an RFID tag of
the most primitive kind. Heurich went on to chastise Ashton for expressing the idea
that a dime tag was possible, let alone a nickel tag, by making a reference to science
fiction (Star Trek): “Those who claim that a marketable 10-cent RF tag...are wholly
irresponsible. Are the claims possible? Yes, as is the ability some day of Scotty beaming us
up (emphasis added).” Heurich went on to point out that the AIDC had no real solu-
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Perhaps companies that have no real solution to compete in the smart
label market would prefer the market remain confused and misinformed?
Several times per week we receive sales lead asking for...[a tag
that]...should cost 10 cents. Our sales staff makes a point of first attempt-
ing to inform the inquirer that no such RF Tags exist and if they persist we
refer them directly and by name to those competitors responsible for mis-
informing the market. If they claim it, let them burden the costs to service
it. (emphasis added) (Quinn, 2000b)
In a final salvo, Heurich referred to a memorandum that RFID Inc. had sponsored
at the Automatic Identification Manufacturers (AIM) association: “Please reference the
AIM referendum initiated by RFID, inc. and signed by many RFID companies calling
for self regulated constraints on claims and the need to not mis-educate the public.”
In his editorial, Quinn broadly supported Heurich’s letter that generally expressed
the views and frustrations of incumbent producers in the RFID industry. He pressed
home the point that the AIDC’s pursuit of the five-cent tag was unrealistic and
bordering on science fiction by pointing to the “hard evidence to date”: 
Mr. Ashton is evangelistic about ultra-low-cost, ubiquitous RFID—wireless
U.P.C., as it were. And some very big organizations have put up serious
money to help develop the concept. But for this technology, the journey
from lab to practical application promises to be a long one, judging by the
hard evidence to date. (Quinn, 2000b)
However, Quinn did publish Ashton’s reply to Heurich. Ashton initially expressed
a conciliatory tone by acknowledging that “Most currently available technology for all
the reasons that Mr. Heurich has outlined in his letter don’t scale down to the costs
that we’re looking at; (he’s) completely right.” But the reply was notable for three
comments that underlined how diametrically opposed Ashton’s views were compared
with RFID industry incumbents, such as Heurich. According to Ashton: 
The question is, Is today’s technology as good as it gets? Or are there new
ways of approaching the problem? Our view at MIT is that there are new
ways of approaching the problem. We think there are ways to get these
costs down (and) we’re working on it...This is a new problem, certainly
for the semiconductor industry, which has historically focused on “more
power.” There’s never really been a need for a very-low-cost, lightweight
IC, so it’s not something that’s had as much R&D put against it as has (the
challenge of creating) more power, more features. (Quinn, 2000b)
Second, to underline his point, Ashton quoted a famous example in the history of
invention: 
[W]e shouldn’t close our minds to the possibility that there are other ways
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example, Lord Kelvin, who was then chair of the Royal Society in Great
Britain, and was probably one of the world’s leading scientists, said it was
impossible. (Quinn, 2000b)
This led Ashton to state that “The idea that at the start of the next millennium it will
be impossible to make an RFID-like piece of technology cheaply is, to me, absurd.”
This very public war of words raged on into 2001. In July 2001 ID Systems carried a
large article called “RFID Feeds the Supply Chain,” where Deb Navas, Editor-at-large,
devoted space to the problems caused in the RFID industry by “extravagant claims” of
soon-to-arrive cheap RFID tags which were, according to her, damaging the industry’s
growth prospects: 
Cost remains another big issue for RFID vendors and potential customers.
Extravagant claims of “imminent price breakthroughs” have plagued the
industry since the mid-1990s, when RFID was hyped as the up-and-
coming replacement for U.P.C. labeling in grocery applications. According
to many industry experts, such statements are blatant misrepresentations,
dampening potential user enthusiasm for implementing the technology in
applications for which it is ideally suited, or in which the technology’s
advantages would clearly outweigh higher system costs. (Navas, 2001)
This opinion was shared by many industry players who had long and illustrious
careers in RFID development. For instance, Jerry Landt, who had worked at LASL and
for one of the original industry pioneers, Amtech, and subsequently became the
research director at Transcore (sole supplier to the ARA and many tollbooth systems)
countenanced that: 
To really be honest this is an industry that seems to attract a lot of interest.
Over the years I have noticed that people always like to quote real low
prices just to try to get interest in the technology and their product. Real
low prices, real elaborate claims on performance and these kinds of things
and it’s actually, I think, slowed the development of the industry down
because the potential consumers get very confused. If they are looking at
one system from a vendor and they are about ready to buy and they say
this is going to save us money and all that and then somebody comes out
and says, “Just wait a minute, next year I can provide that same function-
ality for half the price”, well, they are going to wait. And if that doesn’t
happen the whole thing just slows down. You have seen that happen over
the years. (Landt, personal communication)
In their July 2001 report, ID Systems upped the stakes in the debate by providing
data on RFID tag costs to illustrate that the industry had reached a dead end with a
floor price of a little over 30 cents each for an RFID tag (excluding any packaging costs).
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a bar code, thus providing evidence for incumbents’ beliefs that RFID tagging would
not replace bar codes anytime soon (Table 1).
In the same article, Heurich was quoted again, this time saying that: “I don’t see
prices coming down. If someone comes up with even a ten-cent tag within the next
few years, it’s going to be another technology. People expect an integrated circuit
tested and attached to an attenuating antenna for that price?” Then he criticized the
AIDC advocates again, this time saying that: 
The industry has worked hard to dispel myths about RFID, but then
another outlandish claim comes along, like that in a recent article pro-
claiming that the five-cent tag is coming to market...It causes customers
to postpone implementations, waiting for something that doesn’t exist.
(emphasis added) (Navas, 2001)
The rhetoric underlined the fact that not only did industry incumbents believe they
were right, but they also felt confident enough about their beliefs to openly chastise
those that disagreed with them.
Although existing industry players insisted tag prices below 35 cents were impossible,
the AIDC continued to speculate on 25-, 10-, 5-, or even 1-cent tag prices—precisely the
kind of speculation that was infuriating industry incumbents. In September 2001,
Ashton gave a keynote address at an international “smart labels” conference in
Cambridge, UK (Ashton, personal communication). In his address, he told the assembled
audience of technologists that the AIDC was endeavoring to re-write the rule book of
the RFID industry rather than play by it. Ashton referred to Sanjay Sarma, the research
director at the AIDC: “As my friend and colleague Prof Sanjay Sarma is fond of saying,
the “rules” about silicon that everybody knows were made at places like MIT, Berkeley
and Stanford...And if we don’t like the rules, we can change them.” He continued with: 
The solution is to build new roads: to change the rules. Making chips too
expensive? Make it cheaper. Handling is impossible? Make it possible.
Table 1 Manufacturing costs for 13.56-mhz radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags reported in ID Systems (2001)
Information courtesy of RFID Inc.
Silicon die (depends on size) 6–8 cents
Slice/dice 2 cents
Test 2 cents
Pick-and-place chip onto antenna 10 cents
Printed antenna 10 cents
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Testing too costly? Find another way to test. These “rules” are not laws of
physics or God. They are just technology boundaries—boundaries that
until recently hadn’t been explored because there was no call for smaller,
cheaper, simpler silicon chips...The claim that silicon can never be cheap
enough simply isn’t true. (Ashton, personal communication)
Two months later, in November 2001, the AIDC confidentially circulated a “white
paper” report to its members entitled: “Towards the 5c Tag” (Sarma, 2001). In it, the
center laid out the economics of very high volume tag production, concluding that
“the goal of the 5c tag is difficult but achievable.” According to the center, cheap RFID
tags could be mass-produced using both conventional manufacturing technology and
new manufacturing methods such as Fludic Self-Assembly (FSA). This affirmed that
in the center’s view, RFID tagging might one day compete with bar coding as the tech-
nology of choice in many logistics applications, based on comparable fully built-up
costs. This provided evidence for the challengers’ beliefs that the incumbents were
wrong about the future prospects for the RFID industry.
As the debate rolled into 2002, there was still no resolution. In June SCAN: The
Data Capture Report, a popular trade magazine that had catered to the logistics
industry since 1977, ran an editorial “explaining why major end users are frustrated
with the RFID industry for hyping its products. Basically, they are tired of hearing
about five-cent tags that don’t exist...” (Morgan, 2002). In July, a response came in,
this time from Alien Technology, an up-and-coming tag manufacturer which was
part of the AIDC. Jeff Jacobsen, Alien’s CEO, and Tom Pounds (Alien’s VP of
Marketing and Business Development) laid out the economics of disposable RFID tags
in great detail, based on Alien’s proprietary FSA manufacturing process, asserting
that the AIDC’s claims that the nickel tag was coming were indeed correct. According
to Pounds: 
I see SCAN/DCR from time to time and generally appreciate the quality of
your insights into the AIDC marketplace. [However,] your most recent
editorial expressing skepticism regarding low-cost RFID may put your bar
code-oriented audience too much at ease. Low-cost AutoID is coming
within the next three years, and it will have a major effect on many indus-
tries and applications. (Morgan, 2002)
Based on the information Pounds and Jacobsen gave to SCAN/DCR about low-cost
RFID, Table 2 summarizes Alien’s views on the prospective costs of RFID (which were
broadly shared by researchers at the AIDC). This analysis suggests that challengers
might be justified in claiming that RFID would substitute bar coding in many applica-
tions over a medium term (2–5 years) time horizon.
SCAN/DCR also published responses to Jacobsen/Pounds, including a summary of
the responses of four major RFID vendors: “The gist of what we heard from those who
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In summary, RFID industry incumbents and challengers had staked-out incompat-
ible positions on the future prospects of the industry. Incumbents claimed low-cost
RFID was impossible and that RFID would not substitute bar coding; challengers
claimed they already had the solutions in sight that would make low-cost RFID a real-
ity and that RFID would start to substitute bar coding within a few years. How could
people working in the same industry come to have such divergent opinions?
3. That is a nice story, so what?
Superficially, it might appear that the battle between incumbents and challengers in
the RFID industry was simply a matter of “cheap talk” (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Yet
the intensity of the debate and the stakes involved seen to indicate deeper commit-
ments were at work. A Kuhnian/Dosian perspective suggests that incumbents and
challengers talked across one another because they were practicing their trades
according to different worldviews, that is according to different paradigms.
Technological paradigms embody the accumulated body of knowledge of a techno-
logy but also encompass an outlook on the technology that includes definitions of its
capabilities, relevant problems to be solved to yield improvements in the technology,
and the specific practices for acquiring new knowledge about the technology. Dosi
(1988: 1534) has stressed that technology paradigms determine the notional opportu-
nities for future advancement of the technology. Similarly, Rosenberg (1976) has
highlighted the importance of what he called “focusing devices,” that is technologists
Table 2 Differences in radio frequency identification (RFID) tag manufacturing costs, com-
paring conventional pick-and-place robots with fludic self-assembly (FSA) reported in SCAN/
DCR (2002)
Information courtesy of Alien Technology, Inc.
Pick-and-place robots FSA
Tags per day 50 million 50 million
Capital investment required $200 million $2.5 million
Staffing 200 + staff Average 1 operator
IC dimensions 1300 microns (1.3 mm) Test chips: 850 microns; 
Production: 390 microns; 
Possible: 30 microns
IC area 1,690,000 microns sq. 152,100 microns sq.
Sawing alley between Ics 70–150 microns 10 microns
ICs per 8-inch wafer 15,000 250,000
IC cost 7–12 cents 1 cent
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focus their search activities on prototypical problems, opportunities, and targets.
These focusing properties of paradigms can be thought of as partitioning the notion
search space attainable at any one time into specific regions on the grounds of the
available paradigmatic knowledge (Dosi, 1988: 1535). In other words, each technology
paradigm involves a specific technology of technical change (Dosi, 1988). The essen-
tial point is that well-established paradigms are knowledge bases that heavily influence
the direction and intensity of efforts to improve a technology. Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, paradigms also define what does not get searched for because it is
thought impractical, impossible, or not worth trying. In Dosi’s (1982) words, a tech-
nology paradigm “embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of technical change
to pursue and those to neglect” (italics in original). Several notions including compe-
tency traps (Levitt and March, 1988), core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1994), and
absorbative capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) all point to the idea that the existing
know-how of technologists colors what information they recognize as valuable
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1994).
Because technology paradigms define the notional “opportunity space” available
for improving a technology, it is sometimes useful to think of technologies progress-
ing along the fairly ordered “trajectories.” Technology trajectories can be thought of
as the progression “along the economic and technological trade-offs defined by a
paradigm” (Dosi, 1988: 1128). An excellent example is Moore’s Law in microelectronics.
According to Moore’s Law, improvements in the performance of semiconductor
devices follow from increasing the density of transistors on a given area chip space.
Moore predicted density would double every 18 months, a prediction that held rather
well throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Increasing chip speed by increasing the density
of transistors on the chip thus defined “normal” problem solving in semiconductor
research for many years. Research victories in semiconductors were accumulated pre-
cisely by limiting the exploration activities according to the way Moore had defined
the problem of semiconductor research, and these strategies had proven to be
extremely successful. According to Dosi, although there is no a priori reason why one
should observe the relatively ordered accumulation of a technological trajectory,
the evidence suggests straightforwardly that technologists’ explorations are limited
by paradigms such as Moore’s Law. Because these knowledge bases constrain the
directions of innovative search by determining the notional opportunities of future
technical advance, they produce fairly orderly patterns of innovation. Therefore, the
way in which we observe technological change in industries is often as an orderly tra-
jectory of improvement (Dosi, 1988: 1129).
One important consequence of paradigms is incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962),
which means that paradigms can be sharply discontinuous—or “out of line”—with
one another. When rival technological paradigms compete for dominance in an industry,
each body of knowledge specific to each technology determines the perceived oppor-
tunities for improving the technology (Dosi, 1997: 1534). Heterogeneous paradigms
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improvement in an industry. Different technology paradigms have their own solu-
tions to a particular problem and attempt to suppress each other’s novelties: 
Technology paradigms have a powerful exclusion effect: the efforts and the
technological imagination of engineers and of the organizations they are
in are focused in rather precise directions while they are, so to speak,
“blind” with respect to other technological possibilities. (Dosi, 1982: 53,
italics in original)
Hence, technologists can have views that are persistently incommensurate with one
another. In Kuhn’s view, schools guided by different paradigms “are always slightly at
cross purposes” (Kuhn, 1962: 112). Moreover, given bounded rationality and uncer-
tainty (i.e. limited knowledge), there is no reason to suppose there is any way of adju-
dicating between different schools of thought (Dosi, 1982: 159) and therefore no
reason to believe that the powerful exclusion effects of paradigms might be amelio-
rated, or even that amelioration is necessarily desirable. Such incommensurability can
occur in weaker and stronger forms. Stronger forms of incommensurability can occur
when technologists working in different paradigms share so little of their practices,
procedures, and thinking that they barely comprehend one another (imagine a con-
versation between organic and synthetic dye manufacturers in the 1870s). Weaker
forms of incommensurability mean that technologists basically understand each oth-
ers’ principles and practices, but differences in their customs and behaviors still lead
them to hold divergent beliefs about a technology. As Kuhn seems to suggest when he
wrote that different paradigms are always slightly at cross-purposes, the affects of dif-
ferent worldviews on the outlook of different individuals and communities are often
quite subtle. But even fairly subtle differences can result in industry participants talk-
ing across one another, very much in the fashion witnessed in the RFID industry.
4. Why the bitter quarrel?
Technology paradigms help us understand why the notion that RFID tags might be
produced for a nickel, as the AIDC suggested, was completely alien to the worldview
inhabited by incumbents in the RFID industry. Normal business in an industry, such
as normal science, rests on the assumption that business people know what the tech-
nology and market are really like, and those who share a worldview attempt to sup-
press novelties that subvert their basic commitments (Kuhn, 1962: 5). The RFID
industry functioned based on certain premises about the nature of RFID technology.
Given these premises, vendors sought out niche application markets for relatively
high-priced tags and readers and often used distribution channels that included value-
added resellers who tailored products to very specialized applications. These business
practices were aligned with incumbents’ basic conceptions of, and commitments to,







aval Postgraduate School D
udley Knox Library user on 02 Septem
ber 2021
Incommensurate technological paradigms 799
different innovative opportunities for RFID. Their views involved ideas that were very
much at odds with the existing industry. This section of the article traces the paradigmatic
roots of these differences and disagreements between incumbents and challengers.
4.1 Understanding the incumbent paradigm
Understanding the incumbent paradigm in the RFID industry requires an under-
standing of three elements of RFID systems in 2000: (i) the basics of RFID tag fabrica-
tion; (ii) the dynamics of semiconductor innovation; (iii) the business model used by
RFID vendors. First of all, in RFID tag fabrication there were three key processes that
were generally performed by different firms:
• Semiconductor fabrication: RFID dies (ICs) were typically made from 8-inch
diameter silicon wafers. Thousands of identical ICs each as small as 1.3 mm (1300
microns) on each edge (∼1.7-mm squared) were laid down on one wafer. These ICs
were then tested and cingulated (cut) from the wafer using a diamond saw. Five
major semiconductor producers shipped 98% of RFID microchips in 1999.
Because the demand for RFID dies was relatively small and the capital costs
incurred in semiconductor manufacturing was high, these firms produced dies
using equipment and processes that were also used to produce more complex and
higher volume chips.
• Inlet manufacturing: This process involves handling the tiny die by picking it and
placing it (using a robot) onto a substrate and attaching an antenna (normally
copper) to produce an unpackaged RFID inlet.
• Tag assembly: This involves packaging of the inlet into a finished product of some
kind. Examples include adhesive “smart labels” (a wireless bar code) and identifica-
tion cards used for keyless access to a building, etc. In the United States, around
500 firms were actively supplying finished tags in 2000; many focused on specific
niche markets.
A large part of the cost of a finished RFID tag was attributable to the semiconductor.
As Dosi (1984) has documented, semiconductor manufacturing is in many ways a
quintessential example of technology paradigm and trajectory. The trajectory of semi-
conductor fabrication led to ever smaller, cheaper, better functioning microchips.
RFID vendors adapted their business model to the dynamics and boundaries created
by the semiconductor technology trajectory. Moore’s Law made it possible to add
more and more functionality to an RFID tag, and RFID vendors responded by mar-
keting more and more functionality to users. Research and development activity in
the RFID industry focused on leveraging the innovation opportunities enabled by
Moore’s Law, such as adding encryption functions and increasing the memory space
on tags. In Dosi’s terms, the direction of innovative search was focused on a particular
cluster of technological characteristics; explorations of the notional characteristics
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applications, adding functionality to the tag provided a competitive advantage for
RFID vendors who sought better margins by providing customers with better func-
tionality (Christensen and Bower, 1996). A short example of an innovative RFID
application illustrates this point.
Beer kegs are used by brewers to deliver beer from the brewery to its point of sale.
After use, they are returned to the brewery where they are washed, repaired (if neces-
sary), and refilled ready for the next delivery. For many years, kegs have been tracked
by bar coding. However, 2%–5% of bar codes do not “read,” a new label is required
for every trip, and labels are abused along the supply chain by defacing/peeling off,
resulting in a typical brewery losing 4% of its kegs to theft every year. RFID tags
provided a solution. Encapsulated in plastic, a tag is more robust than a bar code, can
be used for multiple trips, and “reads” almost 100%. With their high memory facility,
RFID tags can have encrypted information written to them by an RFID reader, ena-
bling beer companies to track the history of a single beer keg over its lifetime. This
resulted in several benefits. Brewers had less kegs stolen and increased their sales by
better controlling “unofficial” fake beer going into the distribution chain. By storing
the precise weight of each keg on the tag, brewers paid less duties because they can
precisely record the amount of beer they recover from the bottom of each keg on its
return. They also saved on maintenance because cleaning data are written to the tag
on each keg, so the brewers could schedule keg servicing.
The brewery example is an illustrative example of the pushes and pulls that created
a particular trajectory of innovative activity in the RFID industry. One of the strengths
of the RFID industry was its strong engineering approach and its accumulation of
tacit knowledge by learning-by-doing. This was important because much of the finer
science of RFID tagging is still not very well understood (e.g. antenna design), so the
industry relied on knowledge accumulated by experimenting with the technology.
This resulted in a lot of customized solutions, with different vendors producing tags
to different technology standards. The RFID industry thus developed a mishmash of
different standards for different applications, and vendors’ business models were fre-
quently based on locking customers into incompatible technology. RFID vendors
mainly competed by offering RFID tagging solutions that were based on increasing
the functionality of the technology. In Dosi’s (1988: 1128) words: “It quite often hap-
pens that prototypical problem-solving models, rules on how to search and on what
targets to focus, and beliefs as to ‘what the market wants’ become the shared view of
the engineering community.” Elsewhere, scholars have pointed out that this results in
“industry recipes” (Spender, 1989), that is a general consensus in an industry on how
business is done, what customers want, what the purpose of R&D is, and how firms
make money. Using this model, RFID vendors were collectively successful in increas-
ing the diffusion of RFID throughout the 1990s. They premised their future activities
on continuing to do business in a paradigm that had proved it worked. All of these
efforts were directed at making RFID valuable in certain applications but were far
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4.2 Understanding the challenger paradigm
The AIDC’s approach to RFID represented a different paradigm in RFID tagging. It
called its design the EPC Network. The origin of the EPC Network lays with an MIT com-
puter scientist, Dr. David Brock, who had a research interest in what is sometimes known
as the “perception” problem or “object computer interface” problem in robotics, that is
how should a computer perceive its environment? The easiest way to understand why the
EPC Network was a different approach RFID tagging is to understand these origins.
Brock developed a novel way to think about how robots might handle objects by
pointing-and-clicking at an RFID tag on the object, the same way people point-and-click
on hypertext on the Internet. Brock imagined every object being embedded with an RFID
tag that held a unique identification number (an EPC) that robots would “click” on the
tag using their RFID reader and that the click would take the robot to a webpage where it
can retrieve an infinite array of information about the object that the tag is attached to:
what the object is, how to pick it up, etc. The EPC Network evolved out of this idea.
Brock’s innovation was explicitly architectural in nature (Henderson and Clark, 1990).
The EPC Network owed more to the system architectures of the bar code and the
Internet than it did to the traditional practices of the RFID industry. Consistent with
theory and evidence in the history of technology (Reinganum, 1983), this challenger
technology was not a product of the existing industry but a contribution of an
outsider whose ideas were grounded primarily in the normative practices of computer
science, not RFID. Brock’s innovation was not in fact a radical departure from estab-
lished practices in these other industries, although it was a radical departure in the
RFID industry. The EPC Network in fact combined three technologies that already
existed: product codes, RFID, and the Internet. Per Henderson and Clark (1990), the
essence of this architectural innovation was to recombine existing technologies in a
new way. Each of these technologies had its own distinct history up until that time.
Brock’s innovation did not leave the system components untouched, but it did leave
the core design principles associated with each of the components intact.
The EPC Network involved distinctly different trade-offs than the ones that were
traditional in the RFID industry. These differences in trade-offs meant the EPC
Network was a different paradigm to the incumbent RFID paradigm. First, the EPC
Network was conceived as a truly “open” system designed so that all manufacturer’s
tags and readers would be interoperable. Second, the EPC Network dramatically sim-
plified RFID tags by putting very little data on a tag: just a product code. Third, the
product code on the tag was linked to a databasing system via the Internet (or an equi-
valent data interchange system), and all information related to the product code was
held remotely on databases. This removed all the complexity from RFID tag to minimize
the cost of tags (low variable cost) but increased the infrastructure requirements to
support RFID tagging (high fixed costs). This design was an inversion of the basic
principles used in the incumbent RFID technology paradigm, where there were a
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particular applications, such as ocean-going containers [Savi] and railroads
[Amtech]), tags were relatively complex (high variable cost), but the system require-
ments were minimal (low fixed costs). For applications involving relatively few RFID
tags, the incumbent paradigm was cost-effective. But for applications such as mass
retailing and fast moving consumer goods where billions of RFID tags might be
required, the EPC Network promised lower costs because the variable costs of tags
were minimized, the higher fixed costs could be spread over billions of items, and
open standards facilitated data transfer between producers, distributors, and retailers.
These different trade-offs led incumbents and challengers to see the innovation
opportunities and imperatives in RFID quite differently. Sanjay Sarma, the AIDC’s
research director, calculated that in principle the EPC Network could reduce RFID
chip sizes significantly and therefore drive the cost of an RFID microchip down from
7–12 cents to perhaps 1 cent. However, as chips started to get extremely small, a key
constraint in RFID chip costs emerged. Chips started to get smaller than conventional
robots could economically handle them. This meant that conventional IC fabrication
techniques resulted in a floor in the size of RFID dies, at around 1.7-mm squared.
Below this point, chips got smarter but they did not get any cheaper. This problem
was well known in the silicon industry as the “packaging problem.” RFID incumbents
had adapted their business model to avoid this technology barrier. But the EPC
Network made trade-offs that demanded that microchips must be very tiny to be
cheap. Instead of adapting to the constraint, the AIDC had to attack this constraint
head-on: “This handling curve is a product of current manufacturing technology and
it’s never before been necessary to really make handling cheap...but this is one case
where you actually need to take that handling bull by the horns. You have to solve that
problem.” (Sarma, personal communication). Very cheap RFID tags were essential to
the proposed EPC Network, so Brock’s innovation acted as a focusing device that
directed problem-solving search at the microchip packaging problem (Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1979: 125). Accordingly, the AIDC was informed by a technology paradigm
that led to a different intensity of search for ways to produce very cheap, disposable
RFID tags than the incumbent RFID paradigm (Dosi, 1997: 1535). Its paradigmatic
commitments meant that the ways the AIDC approached the innovative opportuni-
ties available in RFID was different from incumbents. This inclination was further
reinforced by the founding members of the AIDC such as Kevin Ashton (who came to
the center from P&G, which had widespread experience in mass producing low cost
consumer goods), Alan Haberman (who was a pioneer of the bar code which, in its
initial stages, faced similar criticisms to the ones the EPC faced), and Sanjay Sarma
(who was a manufacturing operations researcher at MIT).
4.3 Were these two RFID paradigms really incommensurate?
Returning to Dosi’s description of technical paradigms as exemplar artifacts and a set
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the incumbent RFID paradigm and the challenger paradigm. First, the basic ideas
underlying the architecture of the two systems were different. Incumbents had one
conception of the industry: relatively sophisticated tags (increasing owing to Moore’s
Law) applied to niche applications supported by a mishmash of local, application-
specific standards (customized solutions with barriers to switching). Brock’s ideas
presented an alternative conception: dumb tags (lowest possible cost) for mass market
applications supported by universal standards (any tag works with any reader, includ-
ing across multiple frequencies). These two conceptions sat uneasily with each other.
Second, the core problems that required search and solution were defined differently
by each paradigm. Incumbents primarily targeted their problem solving toward better
tag and reader performance so that RFID could be of value in a wider range of appli-
cations (i.e. across a broader set of market niches). This strategy had proven itself as a
viable model for diffusing RFID technology and had led to a steady expansion of the
industry. By contrast, the AIDC defined its focal problems as developing ways of
packaging very small microchips and developing the technical standards and infra-
structure for an open EPC Network. The strategy was to achieve a breakthrough in tag
costs. Third, each paradigm publicly undermined and diminished the achievements of
the other side. Clearly at cross-purposes, they talked across one another. For instance,
the AIDC’s research director, Sanjay Sarma (personal communication), remarked
that when he began working on a way to handle very small microchips “people were
laughing at me.”2
Perhaps the most conclusive evidence on the role of technology paradigms appears
in the thinking of the direct participants themselves. Kevin Ashton, the executive
director of the AIDC, was particularly perceptive in this regard. According to Ashton: 
If you find anybody who is involved in RFID who is not a sponsor of the
AIDC then the chances are by now that they will be a skeptic. Talk to the
Automatic Identification Manufacturers Association, talk to some of the
RFID related companies that aren’t involved in this project...There are
plenty of people on the technology side who think it can’t be done...
One of the interesting things to me is a lot of the theory about how
innovation happens is playing out before my eyes right now, particularly
with the attitude of incompetent players who...actually find it very difficult to
2As of 2006 tag costs in the RFID industry had declined substantially from the figures touted by
incumbents in 2000–2001, though not to 5 cents. As indicated in Table 1, basic inlays were estimated to
cost 30–32 cents in 2001. According to Read (2005), by October 2005, Avery Dennison was offering
inlays for $0.079 for orders in excess of one million, and Smart Code was offering inlays for $0.075
for order quantities that exceed one million units and for $0.072 for orders of 10 million or more
(notably, both of these firms were new entrants in the RFID industry). At the time, it cost approxi-
mately 2 cents to convert an inlay into a non-printable, pressure-sensitive label (in large volumes),
giving a net figure of around 10 cents per finished tag. These figures were prices openly touted in the
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understand new ways of doing things because they are so locked into the
way they have always done it...
Thomas Kuhn...talks about...partial communication...[O]ne of his
observations is that people schooled in the old theory find it very hard to
communicate with people who are thinking in terms of the new theory
and the other way around. That’s partial communication: you think you
understand but you don’t really...We see that a lot. So you will find many
of the naysayers incredibly convincing because they themselves are
convinced...
There are some concepts that we could probably explain to you as
someone whose RFID knowledge is pretty much a clean sheet of paper
and you would understand in 30 seconds. An expert from the twentieth
century would never understand them because they are so ingrained or so
trained to think about things in a different way...[T]he degree of misun-
derstanding among the people you would probably expect most to under-
stand is remarkable. (emphasis added) (Ashton, personal communication)
What is quite clear from Ashton’s remarks is that at least some of the key players in
the quarrel between incumbents and challengers directly experienced the old and new
paradigms as incommensurate, that is were cognizant of misunderstandings. People
schooled in the “new theory” found it very hard to communicate in any comprehens-
ive fashion with people schooled in the “old theory” and vice versa. According to
Ashton, incumbents and challengers might think they are communicating with each
other, but in fact they do not quite understand each other. And so they talked past one
another, as Kuhn often emphasized. All of which seems to underline the fact that
when technologists inhabit different worldviews they literally seem to practice their
trades in different worlds.
4.4 Bringing the RFID story up to date: the role of users and technology standards
One reason why incumbents and challengers talked past one another was the nature
of the organizations that discovered Brock’s research and decided to sponsor it. The
AIDC was a user-driven organization. Initially it was set up exclusively by and for
users; later vendors and other organizations were admitted as members and made up
approximately half the membership; but only users could sit on the main board which
controlled the activities of the center. The users that ran the center included
Wal*Mart, Target, CVS, the DOD, USPS, UPS, Johnson and Johnson, Pfizer, Kel-
logg’s, and Kodak. For many firms, pre-existing capabilities developed with bar cod-
ing and electronic data interchange (EDI) made the EPC Network attractive. The
AIDC quickly built critical mass after Wal*Mart joined in December 2000. Thereafter,
new members joined the AIDC at five times the rate they had done previously. The
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The AIDC accelerated the evolution of technical standards for RFID by establish-
ing a critical mass of prospective adopters who were committed to universal open
standards similar to the bar code. Consortium members thought it was strongly in
their interests to establish open technical standards for RFID (Haberman, personal
communication). They thought it was suicidal to have multiple standards for RFID
and believed the standards vacuum in RFID was a major roadblock to the diffusion of
the technology. According to a recent review of the standards literature by Tassey
(2000), standards are ubiquitous in technologies such as the EPC Network that inher-
ently have a systems character and are necessity for successful adoption. Tassey
defines standards as collective choices struck between users, producers, and govern-
ment: “An industry standard is a set of specifications to which all elements of prod-
ucts, processes, formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction must conform.” (p. 588).
Tassey points out that because standards have an infrastructure quality to them they
have a “public goods” nature, and hence underinvestment in standards is common.
This was a key motivation for the AIDC, which involved collective action by members
who invested in research and development to innovate within the challenger techno-
logy paradigm, and in universal open standards for RFID.
In fact standards of various kinds were involved in both the challenger and the
incumbent paradigms, which suggests that standards were necessary but were insuffi-
cient on their own to change the RFID industry. There had been various efforts by
RFID vendors to develop technical standards. In 1999 American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) published a standard in 1999 for 13.56 mhz and 915 mhz tags which
covered the air-interface protocol, which was regarded as key because it determined
how the tag and reader communicated. The UCC (which runs the bar-coding system)
sponsored the GTAG initiative which, in effect, was a RFID tag that carried a bar code.
ISO subsequently built on the ANSI standards during 2000–2003 with ISO 18000–1
through 6. The ISO standards were widely supported by RFID manufacturers and
were truly international standards because they met various county requirements.
Despite progressing at a painfully slow pace, they passed through a rigorous six-stage
process of consensus building and voting by members and were well supported in Europe,
Japan, and China, where authorities shuffled their spectrum allocations and power
restrictions to enable a global allocation for UHF RFID (which fell under ISO 18000–6).
However, the emphasis placed on standards by the competing paradigms and the pro-
cess of their pursuit were completely different. The difference in emphasis was captured by
one AIDC advocate who described the situation in the RFID industry in 2002 as follows: 
[T]his whole thing doesn’t work unless there’s a standard. You can’t have
five different groups of people who are all out there waving their flag that
they’re standard. That’s part of the problem. Two major problems existed
before we got into our RFID. One, there was no global standard. Secondly
the IC manufacturers all had their own internal developed standard...The
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The process through which standards were pursued was also different. RFID stan-
dards at ISO were sponsored by technology vendors, not end users, and this made
conflicts of interest inevitable (Farrell and Saloner, 1988). This made the ISO
standards-setting process tortuously slow. Manufacturers had incentives to “game”
the standards-setting process to increase the chance that a technology was selected
that they sponsored and had invested in. By contrast, the AIDC was a consortium run
by users who cared much more about establishing a workable standard rather than
exactly which standard it was. For users, there was an obvious cost to a long period of
no standard, with no compensating gains. Therefore, the goal of end users sponsoring
the challenger paradigm was to do an end run round the standards-setting processes
pursued by vendors of RFID equipment, by establishing the EPC as a de facto standard.
Importantly, users could credibly commit to adopting the technology, whereas
producers could never credibly commit to end user adoption, only to designing and
attempting to sell product based on the standard. For instance, Wal*Mart simply
refused to adopt any technology that was proprietary (Roberti, 2003a), and others,
such as the US DOD, refused to adopt anything that was not both non-proprietary
and also ISO compliant. Wal*Mart told its top 100 suppliers in November 2003 that it
was driving for one open globally accepted RFID standard that it would require all its
suppliers to use on pallets and cases of goods delivered to Wal*Mart warehouses start-
ing in January 2005 (Roberti, 2003b). The DOD followed with similar requirements
for its suppliers. Therefore, introducing a critical mass of users into the RFID industry
changed the dynamics around standards. Users coordinated and collaborated on the
adoption of the EPC. These actions did an end run around the standards-setting proc-
esses among RFID vendors and made ISO 18000–6 actually worth something by get-
ting it widely accepted among end users.
5. Conclusions
To conclude, let me briefly restate the quarrel in the RFID industry as I understand it,
and then assess how well it conforms with the theory of technology paradigms articu-
lated by Dosi.
The story I have laid out here takes as its starting point the evolution of the
RFID industry since the 1970s along a fairly well-defined technology trajectory
that was fed both by developments in the silicon industry and by research and
learning-by-doing in applied RFID settings. Like most innovations, RFID experi-
enced a long, tortuous development path before it began diffusing in the 1980s.
During the 1990s the technology continued to diffuse in many small market
niches, with close collaboration and feedback from users being a very important
part of this process (particularly in the military context). Vendors in the RFID
industry adapted their business models to the benefits and constraints to be found
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However, the technology never found its “killer application” (Eberhardt, personal
communication) and thus stopped short of becoming a mainstream technology.
Then, in 1999, an initially small group of firms launched the AIDC, which pro-
posed a challenger paradigm for RFID called the EPC Network. It turned the basic
principles of the existing RFID industry on its head with an architectural reshuf-
fle. This new paradigm proposed fundamentally different trade-offs than the
incumbent RFID paradigm, and a new research program aimed at innovating on a
few key dimensions of RFID development, including microchip packaging and
universal technical standards. The goal, one might say, was to develop a “dominant
design” in the RFID industry around the notion of making RFID into a wireless
bar code (Utterback, 1994). Subsequently, incumbents and challengers publicly
argued over the technical possibilities for RFID, with both sides talking past each
other. The two paradigms were incommensurate.
How well does this story mesh with Dosi’s theory? According to Dosi (1982:
161), we should be able to identify key paradigms, define the trade-offs and puzzles
the paradigms solve, separate periods of normal technological progress from revo-
lutionary periods, and understand the transitions between paradigms, that is how
an industry re-stabilizes after a paradigmatic clash. The evidence on incommensu-
rate technology paradigms in the RFID industry resonates with the theory. While it
is too early to present findings on the transition between paradigms (or even if there
has been/will be a transition), this study has dwelled on the other elements of tech-
nology paradigms at length. Technological paradigms are indeed alive and well in
the RFID industry, just as Dosi would have us to believe. Other scholars have
reached similar conclusions based on their analyses of different industries. Usselman
(1993: 32) suggests that one could extend the analysis of paradigms to whole indus-
tries and, after a comprehensive in-depth study, Mokyr (1990) appears to have
come to much the same set of conclusions about the influence of paradigmatic bod-
ies of knowledge in the long-term history of technical change. However, inasmuch
as paradigms are “invisible colleges” (Kuhn, 1962), it requires some sensitivity on
the part of researchers to uncover evidence of the broad bodies of shared knowledge
underlie technology paradigms. This evidence arises in inter-organizational interac-
tions, because paradigmatic bodies of knowledge transcend individual firms. The
recent history of the RFID industry presented in this article is one valuable oppor-
tunity to observe the details of incommensurate paradigms interacting in a very
contemporary setting.
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